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FinTech and Financial Inclusion 
“I dream of a Digital India where mobile and e-Banking ensures financial inclusion”, 
Narendra Modi, 16th Prime Minister of India, launch of digital India week, July 1st, 2015. 
 
Baptiste Venet 
 
1. Introduction: Financial Inclusion, Digital Finance and Fintech… 
In 2012, Demirguc-Kunt and al.  posited that, effective and inclusive financial systems are likely 
to benefit poor people and other disadvantaged groups because “without inclusive financial 
systems, poor people must rely on their own limited savings to invest in their education or 
become entrepreneurs -and small enterprises must rely on their limited earnings to pursue 
promising growth opportunities. This can contribute to persistent income inequality and 
slower economic growth" (2012, p.1). Twenty years earlier, McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) 
the funding fathers of the "financial liberalization” school claimed that the development of 
the financial system is at the heart of the economic development process.  
The share of adults owning a banking account is now 69 percent worldwide. However, about 
1.7 billion adults remain unbanked, most of them living in the developing world (Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2017, pp. 2 and 4). The World Bank Group has therefore launched in 2017 the 
World Bank Universal Financial Access (UFA2020) initiative. According to this initiative, by 
2020 the adults who are excluded from the formal financial system will be able to manage 
their financial lives by having access to a transaction account allowing them to store money 
and send and receive payments. The initiative is focusing on 25 countries accounting for 73% 
of the financially excluded, out of which 32% are in India and China (Sapovadia, 2018).  
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Why so many poor people are still financially excluded whereas financial exclusion is 
improving globally (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017)? Financial exclusion is driven by several 
reasons: 
- First because of high costs of branches: branch footprint is small and heavily urban and 
opening hours might be not convenient for people leaving outside the city; 
- Secondly because of high documentation requirements to open a bank account: a large share 
of the population cannot qualify and illiterate potential clients are often excluded; 
- Thirdly because low-income clients find banks intimidating: they often consider that financial 
products distributed by commercial banks are not designed for them. So they might prefer 
more familiar and flexible informal services. Some individuals may also voluntarily decide to 
remain outside the formal financial system either because they do not want to deal directly 
with banks, or they do not perceive the advantage of accessing formal financial services 
because of their lack of education. These individuals will not use a system, product or service 
they do not understand (Ozili, 2018). 
 - Finally, because most banks don’t want low-income clients: costs vary, most banks charge a 
sign-up fee, then a fixed monthly or annual fee, minimum balances, etc. 
At the same time about 1.1 billion corresponding to two-thirds of unbanked adults, have a 
mobile phone (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017). As mobile phone usage expands, so could 
opportunities to “bank the unbanked” (Maurer, 2012). The mobile technology, and more 
generally the so-called “digital finance”, is revolutionizing access to financial services and 
promotes digital financial inclusion (Lauer and Lyman, 2015, Suri, 2017). Digital finance 
includes financial services delivered via mobile phones, the internet, or cards. These 
innovative digital financial services (DFS) have been launched in at least 90 countries, including 
three quarters of low- and lower-middle-income countries) with more than 276 DFS providers 
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and 690 million registered accounts worldwide (49,1% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34% in South 
Asia, 6,8% in Middle East and North Africa, 5,3% in East Asia and Pacific, 3,1% in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and 1,7% in Europe and Central Asia) in 2017 (GSMA, 2018), so encouraging 
millions of people to use more and more digital services rather than cash-based transactions.  
Digital finance is a new source of innovation in financial services. According to the optimistic 
view of Manyika et al. (2016), DFS could provide access to financial services to 1.6 billion 
people in emerging economies, especially to women who are more financially excluded. DFS 
can also increase the volume of new credits granted to individuals and businesses by $2.1 
trillion as well as the volume of new deposits by $4.2 trillion. In this way, DFS would boost GDP 
of emerging economies by $3.7 trillion by 2025 and generate up to 95 million new jobs 
(Manyika et al., 2016).  
The more general concept of “financial technology,” or FinTech, includes any technological 
innovation in the financial sector: retail banking, investment as well as innovations in financial 
literacy and education or crypto-currencies. Originally, it emerged from start-ups and 
technology companies developing user-friendly, cheap and well-suited financial products 
through digital channels. Fintech has now evolved toward a broad variety of technological 
interventions into personal and commercial finance. FinTech companies are both start-ups 
and established financially-oriented IT firms combining finance with 
information/communication technology. (Gomber et al., 2017). FinTech solutions are 
expected to reduce operating costs, making it profitable for providers to serve a larger range 
of customers. For financial-service providers, Manyika et al. (2016) predict that technology 
can bring up to 90 percent cost reductions with respect to physical branches. This spectacular 
expected gain explains why developing economies are quickly moving from traditional 
banking to digital finance.  
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What are the consequences of digitizing finance in emerging and developing economies? 
What do we know about the behavioral changes in DFS users (impacts on savings, remittances, 
etc.) and about the changes in users’ welfare and economic activity? These questions are 
addressed in the remainder of this chapter together with potential avenues for future 
researches. Section 2 reviews the expected theoretical impacts of the rise of digital finance 
and Fintech solutions. Section 3 presents the main existing results of papers on the impact of 
DFS. In section 4, we give avenues for future research. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The potentials of Digital Finance 
According to Ozili (2018) and Manyika et al. (2016), the rise of digital finance and FinTech 
solutions may have many positive effects.  Macroeconomic consequences include: 
• Raising economic growth by providing access to a large range of financial products and 
services to individuals and medium & large enterprises. This enhanced access to 
finance may lead to a reduction of informal economy, and so improve enforcement of 
tax collection and compliance with labor laws.  Other positive impacts relate to formal 
savings--as opposed to saving “under the mattress”--, financial innovation, such as P2P 
lending or new credit scoring methods, and new business formation, such as 
e‑commerce. 
• Improving the efficiency of the global financial system and providing better monitoring 
devices to regulators.  
• Reducing governments spending by improving tax collection, improving the targeting 
of subsidies and creating efficiency gains (Manyika et al, 2016). Digital payments could 
reduce inefficiencies to current payment flows by eliminating leakage (governments 
could replace cash-based social payments and subsidy programs with targeted, direct 
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payments) and by lowering transaction and administrative costs. From a 
microeconomic standpoint, the rise of digital finance could: 
• Enhance financial inclusion (World Bank 2016, Jack and Suri 2011, 2014, 20161, 
Sapovadia, 2018), especially to individuals in rural areas, who save time and money by 
avoiding traveling to far-off branches. DFS can also improve rural economic conditions 
by better connecting villagers to urban migrants (Lee and al., 2018). 
• Provide affordable, responsive and secure banking services to unbanked people. 
Access to a safe money storage and to easy transfers encourages people to trade and 
save more and help them carry out basic transactions such as bill payments (electricity, 
water supply) and money transfers (remittances). 
• Reduce operational and opportunity costs for lenders by doing business more 
efficiently and delivering new services, such as transfers and payments of small sums, 
which are sometimes impossible with traditional banking.  
  
However, the expected benefits of digital finance require three conditions to keep customers 
in the market (Karlan and al., 2016). First, the cost should be low (Ozili, 2018). Second, users 
should be well-informed and well-protected, as well as confident in a good-working digital 
system. Lauer and Lyman (2015) identify seven key risk areas in digital finance: inability to 
transact due to network/service downtime (interrupted and incomplete transactions, 
inaccessible funds, etc.), insufficient agent  liquidity (customers do not have access to their 
own money), complex and confusing user interfaces, poor customer recourse (unclear, costly, 
and time-consuming procedure), nontransparent fees and other terms (lack of transparency 
                                                          
1 The paper published in 2016 is referenced as Suri and Jack (2016). 
6 
 
leaves consumers without a full  understanding of the prices, terms, and conditions of the 
services they are using), fraud perpetrated on the customer, and data privacy and protection 
(poor understanding of new uses of personal data, etc.).  
Last, digital financial services must be primarily “transformational” rather than “additive” 
(Porteous, 2006), meaning that unbanked people can gain access to financial services through 
their mobile without having a prior bank account. The promise of digital finance to “bank the 
unbanked” refers to the transformative model. 
 
3. What about impact evidence? 
The recent growth in the number of DFS worldwide and the excitement generated by these 
initiatives of financial inclusion have prompted the publication of several studies. Many of 
them assess the effects of mobile-payment (m-payment), or mobile-banking (m-banking) 
services–the most common digital financial services, on users. The studies have been 
conducted mainly2 in Africa: South Africa (Ivatury and Pickens, 2006), Uganda (Ndiwalana et 
al., 2011) and mainly in Kenya because of the birth of M-PESA3, the most famous DFS in the 
developing world.  
We present the results of some research studies focusing mainly on clients’ changing patterns 
in financial behavior (savings and remittances) and on some economic impacts (income shocks 
smoothing, employment and impact on poverty) of DFS.  
                                                          
2 Mobile payment systems have also been lauched in other countries such that the Philippines, Afghanistan etc., 
and in a number of countries in Latin America and the Middle East. 
3 “M” is for mobile, and “PESA” means money in Swahili. It was launched in 2007. M-PESA is a money transfer 
system operated by Safaricom, Kenya’s largest cellular phone provider in the country. M-PESA allows users to 
exchange cash for e-money on their phones, to send e-money to other cellular phone users, and to exchange e-
money back into cash. The customer does not need to have a bank account but must be registered with 
Safaricom. 
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3.1. Savings and remittances 
There is mixed evidence on the impact on DFS users’ savings. Focusing on Kenya, Jack and Suri 
(2011) find that between 2008 and 20094, an increasing number of M-PESA customers use it 
as a saving tool: from 76 percent in 2008 to 81 percent in 2009. However, 71 percent of M-
PESA users in 2008 and 77 percent in 2009 continue to put some money “under the mattress”. 
Last, bank account holders save significantly more than other M-PESA user households. Hence 
the formal banking system and M-PESA seems to complement each other rather than 
compete. This is not what was suggested by Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) for who M-
PESA serves as a partial substitute for the formal banking system. Mbiti and Weil (2016) are 
using some information on the savings methods used by households. They assess that M-PESA 
has reduced the prevalence of informal savings (ROSCAs, savings with a group of friends, and 
savings entrusted to a family or friend for safekeeping) by 15 percentage points and reduced 
the proportion of people saving money in secret places by 30 percentage points. However, 
they conclude that although a significant number of survey respondents indicate that they use 
their M-PESA accounts as a vehicle for saving, “the analysis of aggregate data suggests that 
M- PESA is only rarely used for storing value for any significant period of time”. Demombynes 
and Thegeya (2012) investigate the mobile savings phenomenon in Kenya, using data collected 
from a survey conducted for 6,083 individuals in 2010. They define respondents as having "M-
PESA savings" if they report saving a portion of income and lists M-PESA as one of the places 
for savings. A comparison of rates found by the survey shows that 65 percent of M-PESA users 
report having some savings, compared to 31 percent of those who are not M-PESA users. To 
explain this difference in terms of extensive and intensive margins, they compute probit 
                                                          
4 Between 2008 and 2014, Jack and Suri (2011, 2014, and 2016) conducted five rounds of a households panel 
survey across Kenya. 
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regressions where the dependent variable is the probability of saving. Results show that 
controlling for standard variables (gender, marital status, etc.), those who are registered M-
PESA users are 32 percent more likely to report having some savings5. They also assess the 
possible effects of M-PESA usage on sums saved. In an OLS estimation, M-PESA users are found 
to save significantly more than those who are not registered6. Kikulwe et al. (2014) and 
Johnson (2016) conducted small-scale surveys in Kenya. Kikulwe et al. (2014) conducted two 
surveys in the Central and Eastern provinces of Kenya and Johnson (2016) conducted a survey 
in 2010 and 2011 among individuals from households living in three rural districts. Kikulwe et 
al. (2014) find that over 40 percent of the households stated that they use their mobile money 
account as a savings tool in 2010. Johnson (2016) finds that most of the Mobile Money 
Transfers (MMT) users withdraw funds completely after receiving a transfer. It means that “by 
putting money in the phone, […], was not coterminous with a place to “save” in the sense of 
building up balances but was more related to being able to move around with funds”. Using a 
matching methodology and focusing on a panel of mobile money users in Antananarivo in 
Madagascar, Arestoff and Venet (2013) find no positive impact on savings for users even if 
62.7 percent of users rate the impact of cash-in (deposit) on their savings as positive. They put 
it that users may not save more in total, but that they may save differently by using a different 
formal means of savings.  
 
Let’s turn to remittances. Using the 2009 FinAccess surveys, Mbiti and Weil (2016) find that 
almost 35 percent report that using M-PESA has increased their frequency of sending 
                                                          
5 Using an IV strategy, they find that M-PESA registration increases the likelihood of having savings by 20 percent.  
6 The estimate is no more statistically significant in the IV estimation. 
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transfers, while 31 percent report an increase in the frequency of transfers received. This is in 
line with what was found by Morawcyznski and Pickens (2009). At the same time, 35 percent 
of users claim that they sent larger transfers due to M-PESA, while 30 percent claim to have 
received larger transfers because of M-PESA. In contrast, 20 percent report decreases in the 
amount of transfers sent or received, with the remainder reporting no change in the amount 
of transfers received or reported. Combining the 2006 and 2009 FinAccess surveys, they build 
a balanced panel of 190 sub-locations surveyed in two rounds. They find a positive relationship 
between M-PESA adoption and frequency of sending and receiving transfers, although only 
the estimate of sending transfers is statistically significant. These results are robust to FE-IV 
estimations. Arestoff and Venet (2013) find that only the frequencies of remittances sent and 
received are positively affected by the use of mobile-money: neither sums of money transfers 
nor sums saved are impacted. They explain these results by positing that individuals change 
their money transfer method because the m-banking service is cheaper and safer. Jack and 
Suri (2014) find that in the first round (2008), the most important use was sending money for 
25 percent of M-PESA users whereas it was receiving money for another 29 percent. In the 
third round (2010), over 90 percent of M-PESA users say they use the service to send or receive 
money. 
So even there is mixed evidence on the impact of DFS on individual savings, various studies 
offer clear-cut results about the positive impact of DFS on remittances. 
 
3.2. Users’ welfare and impact on economic activity:  
What are the main results of DFS on income shocks smoothing, employment and on poverty? 
Aker and Mbiti (2010) and Klapper and Singer (2014) suggest that digital payments can reduce 
households’ exposure to risk because DFS “connect individuals to the broader economy and 
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can strengthen informal insurance networks. Electronic networks allow families to expand 
their “community,” and can help households smooth unexpected income shocks by accessing 
money or support from a community wider than those physically proximate” (Klapper and 
Singer 2014, p. 9). This is empirically confirmed by Jack and Suri (2014). Using the data on 
Kenyan households collected in 2008 and data collected during the follow-up surveys of the 
same households conducted in 2009 and 2010, they show that facing not expected 
idiosyncratic shocks, M-PESA users consumption is not affected, whereas non-user 
households face a 7 percent decrease in consumption. In her qualitative study, Morawczynski 
(2011) finds an increase in remittances flows. “Such an increase also occurred because M-
PESA made it easier for rural dwellers to make claims on resources. Some expanded their 
network of remitters and began to solicit “small money” from distant kin and relatives. In 
some cases, this cash was used to address unexpected shocks that emerged. In others, it was 
used to prepare for future ones” (p. 166). Masino and Niño-Zarazúa (2014) analyses a case of 
financial innovation in social service delivery implemented in Mexico in the context of the 
conditional cash transfer programme Oportunidades (recently renamed as Prospera). 
Oportunidades’ income support was initially paid in cash at distribution points located in 
towns. Since 2011, all Oportunidades beneficiaries receive the transfer electronically. Their 
results indicate that the transition from cash to electronic payments reduced remittance 
reception costs, and it highlights the contribution of remittances in smoothing consumption 
and mitigating the effects of income shocks.  
Mbiti and Weil (2016), Beck et al. (2018) and Suri and Jack (2016) are focusing on short and 
long-term economic impacts. Mbiti and Weil (2016) use a broad measure of employment that 
includes farm labor, nonfarm labor, and self-employment. Individuals are considered 
employed if they are actively engaged in any of these activities. They show that the use of M-
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PESA is associated with increases farm employment but that it has no impact on nonfarm 
employment. However, Suri and Jack (2016) find that households who experienced larger 
increases in M-PESA access (measured by the number of M-PESA agents within one kilometer 
of the household) were less likely to be working in farming or to have a secondary occupation 
and more likely to be working in “business or sales”. Beck et al. (2018) are developing a 
dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to evaluate the effects of a 
mobile payment on firm-level performance and access to supplier credit in an economy 
characterized by credit imperfections, information asymmetries and the risk of theft. In the 
model, they show that the availability of mobile money reduces the incidence of theft because 
mobile payment secures financial transactions and could give people an access to a safe 
transfer mechanism. It also increases the valuation of trade credit. Calibrating the stationary 
equilibrium of the model to match a set of moments observed in Kenyan FinAccess survey 
data from 2014, they find that eliminating the use of mobile money in an environment with a 
theft probability of 2% translates into a macroeconomic output loss of 1.2%. Then, the 
introduction of M-PESA seems to have a positive effect on per-capita income growth: 
“Comparing the estimated outcome effects of M-PESA with actual growth numbers for the 
Kenyan economy shows that the introduction of the M-PESA technology in 2007 can explain 
10% of the per-capita income growth between 2007 and 2013 thus pointing to quantitatively 
significant macroeconomic effects of mobile money technology through entrepreneurial 
finance” (p. 164). 
Suri and Jack (2016) are focusing on the long-run impacts of Digital Finance and use the five 
rounds of their household panel survey to that end. The dynamic aspect of their analysis is 
implemented by comparing outcomes, as measured in the 2014 survey, of households that 
saw large increases in agent density between round 1 and round 2 with outcomes of 
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households that experienced smaller increases over the same period. They find that access to 
M-PESA “increased per capita consumption levels and lifted 194,000 households, or 2% of 
Kenyan households, out of poverty” (p. 1288). However, this optimistic result is a bit tempered 
the conclusions of Dubus and Van Hove (2017). Using survey data collected among 3,000 
Kenyan respondents, they implement a three-step probit procedure to identify the socio-
demographic characteristics of, successively, the respondents who do not have access to a 
SIM card, have access to a SIM card but have not opened an M-PESA account, and, finally, 
have an M-PESA account but do not save on it. They equate financial inclusion with being able 
to save formally (digitally) using M-PESA. They find that the poor, the non-educated, and 
women do not benefit from the positive effects of M-PESA. Moreover, the problem is, by and 
large, bigger for the rural than for the urban population. 
Last, Banerjee et al. (2016) and Muralidharan et al. (2016) are focusing on the impact of the 
use of Digital Finance on welfare programs and corruption. Banerjee et al. (2016) show that 
the use of DFS to transfer program funds for the same public works program reduced by 38 
percent the program fund expenditure and by 25 percent the corruption in India. 
Muralidharan et al. (2016) show that biometrically authenticated cards for workers employed 
by a public works program reduced corruption and could enhance the ability to implement 
welfare programs in developing countries.  
 
4. Directions for future research  
The literature focuses on mobile payments, especially in Kenya, and on users’ behavior and 
welfare. Some additional papers are dedicated either to digital money (cryptocurrencies) and 
block chain technologies, crowdfunding, mobile trading, etc. Gomber et al. (2017) reviews the 
abundant literature on three digital finance dimensions: business, technology, and 
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institutions. Yet, the impacts of digital finance and FinTech on emerging and developing 
economies still need to be addressed. The most promising issues relate to the following topics: 
- The regulation of digital finance, including security aspects and customer/investor 
protection, such as appropriate KYC (“know your customer”) transparent and concrete rules, 
which safeguard financial integrity and must be institutionalized (Gelb, 2016, Buku and Mazer, 
2017, Karlan et al., 2016). This point, highlighted by Patwardhan (2018), also relates to 
systemic risk (Ozili, 2018). For instance, do we need banking licenses for DFS providers?  What 
is the impact of digital finance on financial stability?  
- The digital models designed for poor households. Karlan et al. (2016) and Gomber et al. (2017) 
call for research in the field of digital insurances. Using financial products based on automated 
weather index models with satellite data are promising instruments to hedge smallholder 
farmers against losses resulting from adverse climatic risks. Enabling poor people to smooth 
their income over time is a key element to tackle vulnerability and reduce the risk of poverty. 
 - The influence of DFS on users’ savings? The papers by Mbiti and Weil (2016) and Johnson, 
(2016) reveal that DFS are rarely used as a savings vehicle for any significant period of time. 
This surprising result can be explained by three factors. First, as it is pointed out by Dubus and 
Van Hove (2017), Jack and Suri's (2011, 2014, 2016) broad definition “savings” refers to any 
form of money storage for more than twenty-four hours. Second, it could be that users save 
differently with DFS (Arestoff and Venet, 2013). Last, Karlan et al. (2016) mention the lack of 
advanced savings products dedicated to the poor. Identifying the most probable causes of the 
“digital savings puzzle” offers fruitful avenues for further research. 
- The real impact of digital finance on financial inclusion. Is Digital Finance really a 
transformative model? According to Dubus and Van Hove (2017), the poor, the non-educated, 
women and the rural population do not benefit from the positive effects of M-PESA. How do 
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these findings compare to the lack of impact found in randomized studies on health, 
education, and women’s empowerment (Banerjee et al., 2015)?  
 
5. Conclusion 
Salampasis and Mention (2018, p. 457) summarize the role of FinTech as “to promote 
transparency, safety, and accountability through a secure, behavioral, cashless, cultural mind-
shift in terms of building a financially inclusive world, strengthening the economic and 
sustainable development.” This quote encapsulates the world’s expectations from digital 
finance and FinTech. However, along with high expectations of Digital Finance come the fears 
evoked in this chapter. Current concerns relate mainly to regulation, impact on financial 
stability, consumer information and protection, and product design for the poor. These 
challenging issues cutting across research disciplines offer promising avenues to scholarly and 
applied research alike.  
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